The bridge between ontological concepts and empirical evidence:an interview with Rob Stones by Jack, Lisa Janet & Stones, Rob
 
 
1 
The bridge between ontological concepts and empirical evidence: an interview 
with Rob Stones 
 
Rob Stones and Lisa Jack 
 
Abstract 
Purpose: To share interdisciplinary ideas about the purpose of social theory in 
empirical  research. 
Design/methodology/approach: The formal interview took place in front of an 
audience at the Strong Structuration Theory and Management Research workshop  at 
IAE de Paris, Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne, on 10 May 2016. A recording 
was made, transcribed and then edited.  Elements from a recorded lecture on the 
same day are also included.  A conversational format is retained to enhance the sense 
of interdisciplinary dialogue that characterises our research project. 
Findings: The use of strong structuration theory as a conceptual methodology is 
explained, and the use of agent’s conduct and agent’s context analyses is elucidated 
providing pointers regarding how accounting research can be developed further by 
basing our analysis in an understanding of the status and adequacy of knowledge on 
which people act to produce and reproduce structure. 
Originality/value:  The value of the interview is to provide insights into the process 
of empirical research and conceptualisation, which are likely to be particularly helpful 
for early career researchers. 
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Interviewer (IV) You’ve said today that all social researchers become social theorists 
in practice but how did you become drawn more clearly into being a theorist and into 
developing strong structuration theory? 
 
Rob Stones (RS) I need to start right back with my postgraduate research.  I actually 
did four dissertations for the Master’s degree in an intellectually outstanding but very 
eccentric political sociology course at the University of Leeds, in which all the 
empirical research I chose to carry out was on Thailand.  At the end of the 70s, 
beginning of the 80s, the choice was either dependency theory or development studies 
in relation to a country in Thailand’s position within the world economy.  There was 
also articulation of modes of production and shades of Louis Althusser and Étienne 
Balibar. These masters’ dissertations were on the twentieth century history of the Thai 
economy and on Thai politics and military – adapting Nicos Poulantzas’ work on the 
crisis of  military dictatorships in Europe in the 1970s (Portugal, Greece and Spain) 
into a Thai context. Then, my PhD thesis was on the Labour government in the UK in 
the 1960s, looking at the room for manoeuvre this Government had, as a social 
democratic government within the international financial system – and also, given 
sterling’s use as a major international currency, examining how this affected this room 
for manoeuvre.  
 
Both of these overall projects were dealing with empirical issues, and I was thinking 
theoretically about them both. So, for whatever reason, I was always drawn to looking 
at the rich complexity of real life, as it were, in relation to questions that interested 
me. Congenitally, my habit is to think theoretically but it was never enough for me to 
just think theoretically. It was never enough for me to think about the empirical 
without the theory.  Through the Master’s degree and some of the PhD, I engaged 
with a number of different theories: Marxist state theory and Weberian state theory 
were at the centre of what I used in the doctoral thesis.  But then I got to wanting to 
look at cabinet meetings and what was happening with the Bank of England and to 
use the memoirs, of which there were many, of politicians in the 1960s. I also 
interviewed the permanent secretary of the new Department of Economic Affairs, and 
the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Bank of England. 
 
At that point, I found that when I wanted to look at real life flesh and blood people, 
these macro theories didn’t help me, so I was drawn to Giddens at that stage. What 
structuration theory allowed me to do was to link really macro historical political 
forces to flesh and blood people around tables like this and in the bar, in cafés, 
wherever – at home, soliloquies, as shown in the memoirs as well.  Actually, it took 
me a while to realise that Giddens wasn’t using his theory in the same way that I was 
using it. I’d already started adapting structuration theory to empirical issues in a way 
that Giddens wasn’t. It took me a while to realise this. As a general lesson, I think if 
you start using a theory for your own particular purposes and you think and worry at 
it, then you will necessarily start developing the theory. It’s not you thinking ‘I want 
to improve on this’; it just happens.  
 
IV Why do you think new researchers find it so difficult to bring social theory 
and empirical work together? 
 
RS I think a quick and easy answer to why people find it difficult to do this is 
because there isn’t a literature on it, and there are no courses devoted to it. There are 
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fragments of literatures on fragments of the process, but it doesn’t exist as an area, as 
far as I can see. If you think of the traditional approach to sociology, we have theory 
courses, and of course theory courses use illustrations from everyday life, but they’re 
just that. They’re illustrations to illustrate a general point. They’re not about 
developing theory to inform – theoretically inform – qualitative case studies. There’s 
that whole area between the abstract and the empirical that isn’t thought of, or isn’t 
identified as, something that needs to be considered in terms of what I call conceptual 
methodology.  
 
IV  You’ve said elsewhere that researchers should really get to grips with the research 
purpose in hand. 
 
RS  Yes, the research purpose at hand is what I was just talking about. There are two 
dimensions of this to start with. One is the ontological dimension, and the other is that 
of conceptual methodology - how do you use those ontological concepts in the 
research process? There are particular ways that strong structuration talks about these 
terms, which are an attempt to identify and characterise particular aspects of the social 
world. When structuration generally is dealing with agency, for example, it will talk 
about the knowledgeability of the actor. That's part of the characterisation of the kinds 
of things that are in the world, that the kind of thing that is an actor- an agent- has 
more or less knowledgeability and that they are motivated to act.  
So that concept tells you to look for motivation, but if you then look at the research 
purpose at hand, you might say, well, actually, do I need to look at motivation for my 
particular issue? You might not. It depends what the problem is. So you need to go 
backwards and forwards between the problem-at-hand and concepts, the exhaustive 
array of concepts that are produced by a particular theory or a combination of 
theories. I add ‘combination of theories’ here because I'd like to say that strong 
structuration is ecumenical. There's no reason why it can't be used with other 
theoretical approaches if those can, together, better address the research problem at 
hand.  
But you might find for your research purpose at hand that the key concepts are, say, 
power and time. You have to keep going backwards and forwards and asking yourself 
about what are the most important concepts, the most relevant concepts for your 
problem at hand as it emerges in the process, the dynamic process, of the research 
project.  
These various aspects of ontology characterise the world in various ways and in real 
life, these concepts point to aspects of the real world that interweave with each other. 
Whenever we're thinking about how to identify our particular interests in the research 
process, we're selecting certain aspects of that fluidity, that flow of going on in 
everyday life, of the structure-agency process. We’re focusing on those aspects and 
leaving others out, because the ones we're focusing on are the ones that are most 
relevant to the problem at hand.  
IV  Then conceptual methodology is this bridge?  
RS  It's the bridge between the ontological concepts and empirical evidence. And 
again, I would say that contemporary social theory doesn't look at these kinds of 
things. There is little literature on what the relationship is between the technical 
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methods of interviews, observation, surveys, and so on, and ontological concepts 
about the character of the world. And that's something that needs fixing.  
There are different levels in thinking about the bridge between ontological concepts 
and empirical evidence, thinking about the concepts and combinations of concepts 
you need, that are relevant, and then thinking about the relationship between those 
concepts and combinations of concepts, the shapes of the concepts and the bits of 
evidence you attach to these, as it were. You'll find that once you are clear about the 
ontological shapes, the bits of available evidence will be seen to be fragmentary. You 
won't be able to cover your ontological shapes with empirical evidence most of the 
time. In terms of reflexive conceptual methodology, reflexive epistemology, we need 
to know what we know and what we don't know. How much is covered in the shapes 
and how much is not covered? And it's not just the shapes. It's the shapes in process if 
it's a causal account. It is as important to know what we don't know as it is to know 
what we think we know..  
At this point in undertaking research in this way, you might well be having doubts 
about what your contribution will be. I think often we just have to suspend our 
disbelief about what the final contribution will be.  The fact that you are using a set of 
concepts with a question, to look at this thing in depth, and you’re seriously training 
your mind on that for this amount of time, means that it is inevitable that something 
good will come out of it.  
 
IV In Structuration Theory (2005) and in Why Current Affairs Needs Social 
Theory (2015), you draw on fictional examples in the form of novels, films and TV 
drama. Is there a particular reason for that and what can we learn from fiction? 
 
RS Yes, I do use a lot of fiction as examples, taking from literature, films, 
documentary films, and so on. Literature is extremely useful for respecting the 
hermeneutic dimension of social life, because novels look inside the heads of people. 
Not all novels, but a lot of novels follow people’s streams of consciousness, their 
internal life, what Margaret Archer would call their internal conversations, their 
emotions, their reasoning, and the interweaving of these. They’re in situ – you know a 
lot about these people’s lives in quite some depth, and then you have the interaction 
between different characters in the contextual field. Because of this, the depth of 
hermeneutic-structural purchase that you have from novels is much greater than you 
can get from almost any social science literature.  
 
Once you’ve used fiction as a benchmark, as it were, you know what you’re not 
getting in the social science literature, but you know it must be there. Talking about 
the ontology from social theory in relation to fiction enables one to identify the real 
complexity of what happens and the richness of what happens. This is very difficult to 
get at through technical social science methods – the nearest you get to it is in various 
psychoanalytic methods, oral history methods, biographical methods, but you often 
don’t quite get there. Also, in fiction you’re often focusing on maybe one person or 
two people, whereas often in our research projects, we want to focus on several 
people or more, and groups as well.  
 
One of the main points I was making in my first book, Sociological Reasoning (1996) 
was that we need to try to cultivate a greater degree of humility in relation to what we 
know. One of the things that I wanted to take from post-modernism was greater 
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humility, and fiction would help here by providing a benchmark. I didn’t want to 
imbibe post-modernism’s weakness, which was its relativism. But I wanted to take 
one of its great strengths, which is that we can’t know everything and need to keep 
ask questions about how we are, and what we know, and from what perspective.  
 
When you compare my way of going about things with positivistic ways of knowing 
the world then it can perhaps seems to complicated. But if we push aside the issues 
that I’m arguing should be placed centre-stage, we are abrogating responsibility. 
We’ve ended up not developing new sophisticated forms of testing and knowing. This 
means we’ve almost entirely avoided the important questions about the status and 
adequacy of our knowledge. This is one of the things that I want the social sciences to 
try and start to address much more seriously by looking at this bridge between 
ontological concepts and empirical evidence.  
Question from the floor It seemed to me that you positioned the researcher as an 
observer who tries to go inside people’s heads and understand the conduct, but at the 
same time, the researcher himself or herself is also part of this process so how do you 
reconcile this situation? 
 
RS The external researcher is an observer of the contextual field. Also, within context 
analysis we have the agents' own context analysis, which means it's the researcher's 
analysis of the in situ agent's perspective and understanding of the contextual field. So 
you have to put yourself back in there to say that's your analysis of what they know. 
It's not raw ‘what they know’. There's a relationship going on there as well.  
When we're characterising context analysis then that form of analysis looks from the 
actor outwards into the field. It's looking outwards, whereas the other form of 
methodological bracketing, agents' conduct analysis, is looking inward into the actor, 
because that's when the researcher is looking at the actor hermeneutically. It's looking 
inside their heads in a particular way, one that is different from agent’s context 
analysis. It's concentrating on how that in situ actor - agent - that you're focusing on, 
deals with that whole process of understanding the context out there in relation to 
their own values, duties, obligations, orientations to the world and so how they come 
to act in one way rather than another.  
Therefore, context analysis is from the actor looking outwards. Conduct analysis is 
thinking, once they've got that information from the context analysis,‘what do they do 
with it’? Think about it this way: what do we do with our personal context analysis 
when we feel trapped or we've got a plan that we can't put into action: we feel 
constrained. We can't put this into action. We feel that discourses are against us. The 
norms are against us. Everybody's stupid. What do we do? How do we deal with that 
situation? That's conduct analysis.  
IV How far does this move away from Giddens? 
The spirit of Giddens is there, and the whole tradition that he's drawing from, because 
he's a synthesiser.  Amongst other things, he's drawing from lots of different fields 
that point towards hermeneutically informed social theory. Think of all the theories 
from symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, phenomenology, existentialism. 
They're concerned with what's happening inside the heads of people. However, the 
key aspect of structuration theory is that what's going on in the heads of people is 
 
 
6 
never free-floating. It's always embedded in those contextual fields that we're looking 
at. Strong structuration theory takes more seriously the challenge of this for research 
practice, which, in turn, has required further development of the theory. 
So what is happening inside the heads of people? When, as a researcher, you are 
interviewing, the words of your interviewees come out... if they're too free-floating, 
they're not much use. They're interchangeable with anywhere, anytime, anyplace. 
They need to be rooted in context, in situ, for them to have flesh and bone, life and 
blood, and when they don’t that's a real problem. Again, this is pointing out a problem 
with technical method abstracted from concepts. So much qualitative work, 
interviewing, observation, and so on, is better seen as occupying a series of small 
spaces. These spaces need to be connected to larger sets of processes in order for their 
enormous significance to be properly grounded and truly grasped. If research into 
what’s going on in people’s heads is not conceptualised in terms of the structural 
grounding of those meanings, they will be too free-floating to be of much use. So the 
technical method needs to be rooted in ontological concepts and in an awareness of 
needing to establish a relationship between the abstract ontology and the empirical 
level.  
IV  Can you give an example? 
I've been writing about current affairs and social theory in order to try and talk about 
the public value of social theory (Stones, 2015). In one chapter, I've used one episode 
from the Danish political drama Borgen to show what audiences already know, how 
literate they already are, because often these things can seem so abstruse and so 
divorced from everyday life.  What I argue is that if the audience are to understand 
this particular episode of political drama with its international relations and 
negotiations, then they have to already understand, in their phenomenological 
background, a lot about contextual fields, different time zones, different power 
relations, hierarchies, consequences etc.  
Nyborg, who's the Prime Minister of Denmark in the programme, is in a position 
practice relation with certain powers, resources, obligations, duties, ideology, the sort 
of things you could map out from the outside. She's negotiating with the President 
from another country, the fictional Turgisia, about wind turbines. There's an 
environmental dimension to it, but there's also a human rights dimension, which is 
another storyline. It's quite a complex narrative, and there are lots of actors, lots of 
processes, lots of time periods involved in this relationship.  
But they can be mapped out. Now, I mapped them out in diagrammatic form in the 
book just so that you can get a sense of what you know and what you don't know in 
the process. But in terms of what we're talking about, what's important is that we've 
got an actor-in-focus here, the Prime Minister of Denmark, but we've also got another 
actor-in-focus, the president of the other country. If you're dealing with context 
analysis, the Prime Minister of Denmark has to know quite a lot about him, his 
position, his power, his relations, and the pressures on him domestically and 
internationally, plus his room for manoeuvre internationally and domestically.  
She has situation-specific knowledge of that, and vice versa. It happens two ways - 
there's more than one person involved. That's important. They've got context analysis 
there, but that's still a surface level of hermeneutic structural awareness of what's 
going on in the contextual field. If Prime Minister Nyborg wants to go deeper, and 
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this is also something wanted by the political team around her within the cabinet, the 
permanent secretary etc., then it is because they want to know more about their room 
for manoeuvre in relation to negotiating with the president. They've got to have a 
deeper knowledge of the hermeneutic processes at work. They have to start to move 
into conduct analysis of the president, because they have to know how he's dealing 
with the various pressures on him from his context and how he's negotiating that with 
his values, ambitions, aspirations, interests, and so on. A more in-depth hermeneutic-
structural analysis is required in order not to have too many unintended consequences.  
In effect, what I'm saying is that the context analysis has to include conduct analysis 
of other actors and a deeper hermeneutic analysis of the actors within the structural 
context. What you can see that you can't see clearly enough from Giddens' model is 
that you're looking at a particular structural context, you're dealing with actors in that  
structural context, and actors in situ, making history in circumstances not of their own 
choosing, structurally embedded actors.  
IV I think we still may have a long way to go to capture this form of analysis in 
our work. Have you been surprised that strong structuration theory has been taken up 
by accountants and managers? 
 
RS Very, yes. Initially – flabbergasted is the word, but being a sense making 
animal, and you might have something to say back about this, what it feels to me as if 
at least two things are going on here. One is that accounting and management is at a 
meso-level, and the other is about precision, I think. To a great degree, a lot of the 
meso-level spatial dimension and sense of organisations has migrated to business 
schools and management schools, and a lot of sociologists have migrated as well, and 
you don’t now find much of this dimension in sociology departments. Giddens’s book 
– his last big book on structuration, The Constitution of Society, which came out in 
1984, was reviewed by a geographer, Nigel Thrift, who– slightly over the top - said 
that it’s all world empires, on the one hand, and courtroom dramas, on the other hand, 
and nothing in between. And there’s some truth in that.  
 
To move to the second point, I think in accounting and management, also, as would 
be the case, say, with air traffic control, precision matters and real knowledge matters, 
and whether your knowledge is adequate or inadequate matters, and even though 
we’ve not quite got there yet, I think there’s a sense in which knowing about the status 
and the adequacy of knowledge is probably more important for the sort of world 
you’re in than it is for many of today’s sociologists.  
 
Apart from this community, there are two others that I’m involved with that use 
strong structuration theory. George Washington University in the USA have a 
Graduate School of Education and Human Development. Their Executive Doctoral 
Leadership Programme brings in a broad range of people, from NGOs and community 
organisations, through trans-national companies, to the US military. Under the aegis 
of David Schwandt, whose own work has combined strong structuration theory (SST) 
with systems analysis (e.g. 2013), the programme has adopted SST as one of the main 
theoretical approaches drawn on for the doctoral research, so there have been about 
probably 15 doctoral theses there that have now used SST.. Another group, this time 
in primary healthcare, is led by Professor Trish Greenhalgh at Oxford University. 
Trish has been using strong structuration theory for various projects in healthcare and 
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technology and we’ve written together four or five times now (see, Greenhalgh and 
Stones, 2010; 2014). 
 
Sometimes just one person in an area uses it. For example, Ruth Barley (2014), used 
strong structuration theory to look at the identity and social interaction of early years 
children from North and Sub-Saharan Africa in a multi-ethnic classroom in the North 
of England. Karen O’Reilly (2012) has written an excellent book on International 
Migration and Social Theory which uses strong structuration theory as the guiding 
approach, and then draws on it to open out international migration in general.  
 
I see strong structuration as the core of my larger intellectual project. Something I’m 
involved in at the moment is a large-scale project on successful societies. Working 
with Bryan Turner from City University of New York, we’re developing a theoretical 
paradigm to frame reflection and research on this topic. I will be editing a new short 
book series for Anthem Press on successful societies, and this will cover multiple 
countries, from the global south as well as the global north. The project is concerned 
to bring moral philosophy and political theory to bear on questions about what makes 
a successful society, both as a whole and with respect to particular domains in a given 
society. What is a successful domain and an unsuccessful domain? The ambition is to 
bring political theory, normative political theory, normative moral theory, into the 
heart of social science, so as to marry this emphasis with social theoretical concerns, 
and, in this, strong structuration theory will be at the core.  
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